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philosophical analysis is a certain sort of defi-
nition.  In particular, it is a definition that
aims to provide an illuminating account of
what the defined-thing is—as opposed to,
say, what that thing is correlated with.  For
example, Plato argued that knowledge cannot
be defined as true belief1.  For, even though
knowledge and true belief are correlated,
they are not one and the same thing.  We can
see as much by noticing that a person might
form a belief on a bad basis such as preju-
dice, and that such a belief would not consti-
tute knowledge even if it turned out to be
true. To employ an example that is, unfortu-
nately, all too familiar, suppose that owing to
nothing but racial prejudice a person believes
that his Latino neighbor is undocumented.
Even if it turned out that they were undocu-
mented, this belief wouldn’t constitute knowl-
edge, though it would be true. Knowledge
requires more than true belief—for instance,
it might require reliably formed belief (rather
than prejudicial belief), or it might require
good evidence2.  
In order to give a successful philosophical
definition of knowledge, one must find some-
thing that is not only correlated with knowl-
edge (as true belief is) but is identical to
knowledge (as true belief is not).  Additional-
ly, one must provide an illuminating account
of knowledge; ‘knowledge is identical to
knowledge’ is correct, but not illuminating!
Philosophers aim for illuminating accounts of
what the things they define are (and not just
what they are correlated with).  Because of
this, philosophers frequently pay attention to
unlikely examples. However unlikely an
example might be (while still being possible),
it is an example that matters to what a thing
is (as opposed to what it is correlated with)3.
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As philosophers, the four of us were delight-
ed to participate in the aforementioned projects
on intellectual humility. Those projects have
helped us think through some of the issues
surrounding the topic. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, they enabled us to establish lasting pro-
fessional relationships with one another, and
with several of our collaborators in psychology.
It is uncommon for philosophers to work and
write together; most philosophical work is sin-
gle-authored.  As a team of four, we were able
to generate a view that none of us could have
generated alone, and that even the sum of us
working independently could not have gener-
ated. We are grateful to the visionaries, team
leaders, PI’s, and the John Templeton Founda-
tion for making these projects possible. 
Below, we address what we see as our
four main philosophical contributions to the
interdisciplinary work of the overall team.
First, we argued for a definition of intellectu-
al humility via the method of philosophical
analysis. Second, our analysis of the virtue of
intellectual humility allows us to distinguish
it from the closely related virtue of open-
mindedness. Third, our analysis of the virtue
of intellectual humility drew a contrast
between it and twodifferent vices—the ‘go-
to’ vice of arrogance and the over-looked
vice of servility. Fourth, in addition to collab-
orating with the overall team of psycholo-
gists, we worked on a specific project with
Wade Rowatt, Megan Haggard, and their
group of psychologists to develop a measure
of intellectual humility.
Offering a Definition of Intellectual 
Humility
As the philosophy-team on these interdisci-
plinary projects, our primary contribution
consisted in analyzing intellectual humility. A
